The nature of regional cooperation concerning the Indo-Pacific region differs greatly from other parts of the world. Mistrust and animosity among countries and competition between India and China and the USA’s interest were significant reasons for the Indo-Pacific’s failure to build a sense of collective security-based identity. The hastily aroused QUAD has generated a new genre of rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, which will undoubtedly reinvent competition, conflict, and collaboration in the region. As India develops its narrative and resurrects world leaders to curb China, similarly, in the name of its Freedom of Navigator principle, the US has vowed to ensure the security of the Indo-Pacific, as it was unable to save its pseudonym in the South China Sea case. Nonetheless, China’s vigilant eyes on the entire Indo-Pacific, particularly the Indian Ocean region has created a new tension regionally. In light of this reality, why would Bangladesh ignore its geopolitical position and prominence, especially when Bangladesh can take advantage of this competitiveness?

Due to China’s regional rise, as well as evolving perceptions of China’s advancing economic and political might, growing political influence, extraordinary diplomatic tone, and growing involvement in regional multilateralism, bilateral relations between China and countries on its periphery have been reevaluated. With burgeoning energy demands and growing growth and development, China seeks access to the Indian Ocean region (IOR). For example, aside from India, only two South Asian countries may provide China with direct access to the IOR: Sri Lanka, an island nation, and Bangladesh, a state that is considered India-locked. On the other hand, the United States has concentrated on bolstering the security of the Indo-Pacific and has pledged to retain the ability to anticipate the fate of this region. Through QUAD, D 10, QUAD+ and AUKUS, India, the United States, and many other leading democracies like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand, actively collaborated to restrict China, conjuring an escalating “Cold War” repercussions.

The focus of this article is to look at the incorporation of middle powers in light of the revived effort to restrict China and how that competition has manifested out in the area. The article examines the evolution of security concerns among certain middle powers of the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, it will delve into the role that Bangladesh can play in the growing competition.

Understanding the Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific

Great, middle, and small powers have grown more clearly distinguishable over time. Middle powers with limited capabilities are forced to target concerns that were permitted by the superpowers.  A critical aspect of their engagement with the globally active United States was the ability to carve out a role in “sensitive” problems, an interaction that is now being scrutinized. Apart from that, it is evident that Chinese growth in the Indo-Pacific is clearly a threat to the middle power’s strategic autonomy even. For instance, middle powers chosen based on the membership of institutions like: South Korea, Japan, and Australia are highly dependent on the Indo-Pacific for trade, and so they believe in FOIP. Therefore, any threat to this FOIP doctrine will also hurt their interest. On the other hand, middle powers selected based on the regional role are directly fighting China due to the 9-dash line. The article will now analyse the actions and interests of a few middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, in keeping with the discussion.

Japan’s road toward building its Indo-Pacific strategy has gone the extra mile. Early attempts to stress Japan’s democratic principles and to form a “diamond of democracies” to challenge China’s rising strength were largely ineffective. The basic objective of the FOIP concept, according to Tokyo, is to establish a global order based on norms and to promote ideas such as trade liberalization, rule of law, and freedom of navigation, which are vital for the stability, peace and development of the region.

Australia, on the other hand, is on a quest to strengthen its Anglo-American identity revival. When Australia declares the Indo-Pacific region to be its self-identified strategic space, it has important implications for Australia’s future interactions with that region.

South Koreans, have undertaken to allude to itself as a middle power with the potential to exert control in Asia and beyond. Under South Korea’s New Southern Policy (NSP), Seoul aims to strengthen economic and geopolitical links with India and the ASEAN.

The combination of its geographical location, Indonesia’s “archipelagic vision,” and real emotions of nationalism indicate that the capability of balancing extra-regional forces is certainly in its foreign policy. For instance, the Indonesia-Australia Strategic Defence Partnership, which took place in 2020, the Australia–Indonesia Dialogue, which began in 2011, and the “2+2” conference of foreign and defence ministers that began in 2012.

Bangladesh’s Engagement with Middle Powers of Indo-Pacific

When it comes to strategic formulations and policies, Bangladesh does not have an enduring maritime history. Yet, the Bangladeshis have important historical legacies as mariners, bootmakers, traders, and shipbuilders, among other professions. This section of the article will examine the ways in which Bangladesh is attempting to integrate with the Indo-Pacific system and interact with middle powers.

The Matarbari port project began with the assistance of JICA, which will end in 2025. The JS Bungo and JS Takashima of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force landed at Chattogram Harbour in 2019 for a three-day goodwill visit. On the other hand, in the north-eastern Indian Ocean was highlighted as an important area in Australia’s 2020 military strategic update, which boosts the prospects for security partnerships in the region. Australia has many other strategic interests in the area, along with the management of threats associated with climate change, human and drug smuggling, and extremist violence. Bangladesh can offer Australia the opportunity to engage in focused capability-building efforts with Bangladesh on specific maritime security concerns in which Australia has a direct interest. South Korea has established a number of bilateral institutions to boost its relationship with ASEAN members. Despite the fact that Bangladesh is not a Southeast Asian Country, it may certainly play a genuine stakeholder role in terms of its access to BOB. In 2021, at the Petro Bangla headquarters in Dhaka, South Korea and Bangladesh inked the deal for DS Block-12. The deal specifies a five-year first exploration phase that may be prolonged with another three years. This production-sharing agreement with the South Korean corporation Posco Daewoo Corporation for the investigation of deep-sea mineral deposits would pave the way for additional collaboration.

In 2019, Indonesia implemented a new fishery management strategy with the goal of reducing illicit, unreported and unregulated fishing. The Vietnamese government is committed to completely eradicating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) crabbing by the end of next year in order to lift the European Commission’s “yellow card”. Bangladesh may work together with both Indonesia and Vietnam, their navy and coast guards to secure their area. This might also lead to a better trade-in fishery sector.

Way Forward

The competition has definitely opened up subjunctive options for the countries. In other words, the growing importance of the region has liquified a contingent scenario where middle powers could be the only scope left for small countries to cooperate securing a neutral position. Bangladesh’s institutional participation in the Indo-Pacific region continues to be essential because Bangladesh has an oceanic exit that is BOB.

The country has peacefully resolved maritime border disputes with India and Myanmar. Now its only priority should be to promote its marine opportunities. However, even though the narrative of the Indo-Pacific from Bangladesh’s perspective is predominantly under development, the country’s maritime zone must be protected and managed through a strong Naval Force equipped properly with the latest hardware and software. Thus, the situation may come out to be tricky and delicate for Bangladesh since China and other international powers have a strong interest in the Bay of Bengal. However, it must be remembered that the BRI will continue to be China’s overarching national priority, whereas India will pursue the notion of FOIP propelled by the United States to counter the BRI in the coming decades, resulting in conflicting power politics in the Bay of Bengal. Thus, engaging with middle powers in Indo-Pacific security will give Bangladesh a bolder voice to execute its strategic autonomy in the BOB. However, it would be in nobody’s interest if external powers entered the Bay of Bengal, which would make Bangladesh and the entire South Asia a Hell on Earth. Bangladesh is a signatory to BRI, and it is also committed to a “free, open, inclusive and secure Indo-Pacific”, which leads the country to a tricky and complicated situation for Bangladesh. Therefore, if not required, Bangladesh should maintain a safe distance from both the USA and China on security aspects to protect but maintain close cooperation with middle powers in generating knowledge to explore, nurture and manage resources of the Bay of Bengal.

Nafisa Nazin Lutfa has been serving as a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Security & Strategic Studies at the Bangladesh University of Professionals.