23 December 2024, NIICE Commentary 9802
Rekha J
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO, a political-military alliance bridging North America and Europe, and South Korea, an ironclad ally of the United States, have rapidly deepened their security partnership. Although the two have been cooperating for two decades, what is the immediate reason behind this recent deepening cooperation between a transatlantic organisation and an East Asian country? Traditionally, South Korea has prioritised an approach that gives firsthand importance to the North Korean threat, while NATO primarily focuses on broader global security challenges. However, this dynamic began to change after 2022 when President Yoon came to power and projected his foreign policy vision of South Korea as a ‘global pivotal state’. His vision took the strategic focus beyond the problems of the Korean peninsula, and it expanded the country’s core strategic interest in the world. At the same time, NATO member states, facing heightened security concerns following Russia’s aggression, were in urgent need of a potential partner for defence collaboration. Thus, the convergence of strategic priorities has laid the foundation for a closer and deeper partnership between NATO and South Korea.
However, their relationship is not new. The two sides established their formal relationship in 2005 during their participation in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. In the case of South Korea, they deployed several military and civilian personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission between 2002 and 2007 as well as between 2010 and 2013. Thus, this cooperation between the two sides within the ISAF mission created more institutional links and generated more coordination between the two. Later, in 2012, NATO and South Korea formalized their bilateral cooperation with the launch of the Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP). This framework was revised in 2017 and 2019 before being upgraded to an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme in 2023, reflecting the evolving scope of their collaboration. Additionally, in May 2022, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service became the first East Asian entity to join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. This milestone also marked a significant step in expanding their partnership into cybersecurity. When it comes to NATO summits, in recent years, Yoon has also participated in the past three years’ summits held in Spain, Lithuania, and the US as an Indo-Pacific partner. These engagements with NATO highlight a pivotal shift in South Korea’s security policy, as the evolving regional security dynamics-marked by increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia through the signing of the Treaty of Comprehensive Partnership and China’s growing military capabilities- have prompted Seoul to diversify its reliance toward Europe while maintaining the United States as its primary ally.
Examining the key factors driving South Korea’s recent deepening partnership from the perspective of NATO member states, one main factor is the military capability gap. Since NATO intervened in Libya in 2011, NATO member states have been acutely aware of its limited ammunition stockpiles. In addressing this gap, South Korea emerged as a valuable partner capable of mitigating the problem of insufficient ammunition supplies. Consequently, in July 2022, South Korean and Polish defence companies signed a landmark defence contract in the wake of the invasion, and within a few months, Poland received its first deliveries of main battle tanks and artillery systems showcasing the country’s capabilities. Thus, beyond Poland, several other European NATO members, including Norway, Estonia, Finland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, also procured advanced weapon systems from South Korea, solidifying its position as a major player in the global defence industry. Additionally, China’s rise as a significant security challenge has been a crucial factor in NATO’s growing interest in collaborating with Indo-Pacific partners (IP4), such as South Korea. Also, the strengthening relationship between Russia and China further complicates the situation, posing challenges to NATO’s interests, security, and values.
From South Korea’s perspective, under its foreign policy vision of becoming a global pivotal state, establishing a US-supported quasi-alliance framework with NATO, even if not a formal alliance, opens up greater opportunities for international cooperation across Europe. Recognizing this, the Yoon administration has viewed NATO as a platform to enhance South Korea’s global presence. Additionally, for Seoul, fostering closer ties with NATO offers a strategic advantage in strengthening its defence capabilities, particularly against emerging threats and North Korea’s rapidly expanding arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons.
While South Korea joining NATO is not a consideration for either side, strengthening their defence partnership offers mutual benefits. NATO member states can address military capability deficits, while South Korea can position itself as a key competitor in the global defence industry. However, the trajectory of this deepening cooperation remains uncertain, as changes in South Korea’s domestic politics and a potential return of Donald Trump as U.S. President could significantly influence the dynamics between these two partners. These factors highlight the complex and evolving nature of their relationship, which will continue to be shaped by regional and global security developments.
Rekha J is a Project Fellow on behalf of the Korea Center at Mahatma Gandhi University, India.
