30 November 2024, NIICE Commentary 9765
Dr.Punsara Amarasinghe
The change in Russia’s nuclear posture is emblematic of a larger crisis looming across, which seems to be the biggest challenge for the global order since the end of the Cold War. Nuclear doctrine is a term largely associated with the realm of military strategies that explains the goals and missions that guide the deployment and use of nuclear weapons, which determine each Nuclear Weapon States’ (NWS) force structure, declaratory policy, and diplomacy. The dominant goals of nuclear doctrine most often include deterrence, target destruction, assurance of allies, and a hedge against an uncertain future.
The Kremlin’s move to alter its nuclear doctrine adopted in 2020 echoes the country’s perennial security dilemma over its sovereignty. In the words of Russian geo strategist Sergey Karaganov, sovereignty is the paragon of the Russian state with its bewitching charm that appealed to countless Russians who made the ultimate sacrifice from Mongol yoke to the Great Patriotic War. It is conspicuous that Russia would not mitigate its emphasis on state sovereignty over the much idealist notion of international peace. The jingoistic statement made by Russian TV host Dmitry Kiselyov in the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by stating “Why do we need a world if Russia is not in it “ was a palpable reflection of the Russian psyche on nuclear weapons.
The decision made by Vladimir Putin to change the nuclear doctrine came two days after US President Joe Biden allowed Ukraine to attack Russian territory with US-made weapons. From a vantage point, the time of the publication of this decision seemed to have intended to send a clear message to the West. It goes without saying that the presidential decree unfolds the actual nuclear strategy that Russia carried out in its post-Cold War context, in which Moscow repeatedly emphasized the importance of nuclear deterrence for ensuring Russia’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity. It should be noted that until 2020 Russia did not release its own nuclear doctrine in the post-Cold War theatre, wherein Russia was on the verge of anarchy due to its own internal chaos in the 90’s.
The presidential decree 991, which replaced Decree 355 in June 2020, presents subtle changes that portray it as a complete transformation. The new document adds only one new page to the original, which contains 25 paragraphs. This updated doctrine fundamentally reflects Russia’s perception of threats following a thousand days of military conflict with Ukraine. A closer examination reveals that the new doctrine has, in fact, lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. This change is evident in the revised textual structure, which has removed the phrase “exclusively for the use of nuclear weapons.” Paragraph 6 of the new doctrine states
“The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure”
While making some adjustments to the 2020 nuclear doctrine, Russia broadens its scope in a more elucidating manner than the previous one. The updated doctrine sets out clearer conditions for using nuclear weapons before any aggression arises from a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear power acknowledging it as a joint attack. The doctrine is a stark contrast to the iteration of the nuclear aggression policy of the previous doctrine as the updated one encourages nuclear reactions even for conventional attacks that pose a critical threat to the territorial sovereignty of the Russian Federation. For the first time, a “potential opponent” is defined, encompassing states or military alliances that see Russia as a threat and possess significant military power.
One of the key features emanating from the newly adopted Russian nuclear doctrine is that it equalizes Russian nuclear strategy with the American one. The US nuclear doctrine bolstered by Article 5 of the NATO Charter explicitly states that it allows using of nuclear weapons in protecting its allies which Russia did not do until Putin issued the new doctrine. The particular focus given to Belarus in the new doctrine denotes Moscow’s concern in keeping its allies.
In the convoluted setting, in which the ambiguity prevails the use of the new doctrine poses key questions to the international analysts. Mainly Biden’s move of allowing Ukraine to deploy US missiles on Russian soil on the eve of his retirement seems to be a reckless act as it leverages Putin’s need to use nuclear weapons and at the same time, the doctrine is a document unfolding that the onus is on Putin for using the nuclear weapons when he wants.
On the other hand, this change of the doctrine might not be a sign of another nuclear apocalypse as how such paranoias prevailed in the Cold War era. From a practical and strategic standpoint, it is preposterous to assume that Moscow would make a suicidal decision by launching nuclear strikes against NATO member states or even within Ukraine. Perhaps the update that Putin issued on Tuesday is an indication showing how Moscow would react in making its coercive approaches to the West. Put another way, Russia has more horizontal escalations to threaten the West for its continued support to Ukraine such as arming Houthis or large-scale cyber-attacks.
Overall, the shift in Russian nuclear doctrine does not indicate that the world is on the verge of nuclear war. As this analysis shows, this change resembles Moscow’s effort to assert its sovereignty by transforming the new nuclear doctrine into a more menacing document rather than a straightforward military policy.
Dr Punsara Amarasinghe is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Law, Politics and Development at Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa, Italy.
