27 July 2021, NIICE Commentary 7208
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy
Every state in this anarchic international system plans to get one thing right – its survival, and this is more so in the case of small powers. For long, Realists have argued that small powers often with their limited material power and geographical constraints are relatively passive. These powers aim to survive by efficiently using their resources, and allying, integrating, and obeying other major powers. The case of Bhutan however seems to contrast this strategy of survival.
To be clear, a variety of factors contribute to Bhutan’s foreign policy formulation. But none equivalent to its geographical determinant and therewith its quest for survival. Sandwiched between two Asian giants: China and India, Bhutan has been keen on ensuring its survival by maintaining its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This has been done in two ways: nurturing a unique relationship with India, and promoting prosperity based on Gross National Happiness (GNH). Although, these means have served Bhutan’s foreign policy goals for a while, the same cannot be said with an assertive China knocking at Bhutan’s door. Seemingly, the same factors that contributed to Bhutan’s survival in the past are now potentially challenging the states’ survival.
Survival Dilemma from the Special Relationship
Several researchers and scholars have considered India and Bhutan to have a special relationship. This special relationship, however, can hardly be separated from the China factor. Whilst, the 1949 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty established a closer relationship between the two states, it was the Chinese aggression on Tibet and its suppression of Tibetan protests that triggered huge anxieties for Bhutan. This was supplemented by territorial claims and disputes raised by China against Bhutan. Having been isolated for a long time, Bhutan hence started moved towards India, barring all of its diplomatic ties with Tibet. It was also in the follow-up of these events that Bhutan was finally convinced to accept Indian aid. Thus, marking the beginning of the special relationship and Bhutan’s economic dependency on India.
Equipped with the role of advising Bhutan’s external conduct vis-à-vis the friendship treaty and then providing significant economic assistance to the former, India began employing the tactics of carrots and sticks to deal with Bhutan. By the 1970s, however, Bhutan expanded its international outreach with the help of India, and also became a member of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it continued facing encroachments and territorial claims from China.
Bhutan finally began its border negotiations with China in 1984, when relations between India and China had improved. Ever since over 24 rounds of negotiations have been held between the two states. Both the states have over 800 square km of disputed territories, extending from the North (Pasamlung, Jakarlung) to the West (Doklam) of Bhutan. However, it was only in 1996 when China intended to close the dispute by providing a package deal where Bhutan would be provided with a total jurisdiction of the Northern territories in return for acceding the Western disputed territories to China. But, since Doklam is a tri-junction located next to India, Bhutan rejected the deal citing its special friendship with India and keeping the formers’ security sensitivity in mind. It further improved this special relationship when it launched Operation All Clear to wipe out Indian militants staying in Bhutanese territories.
Considering this improving relationship, India and Bhutan revised their friendship treaty in 2007, where India renounced its role in advising Bhutan’s foreign policy. Albeit, both the states agreed to keep each other’s national interests and security concerns in their mind while formulating their foreign policy. Thus, when rumours of Bhutan and China establishing diplomatic relations emerged, India responded with an indirect suspension of fuel subsidies that severely hurt common Bhutanese. This persuaded Bhutan to move closer to India again.
In retaliation, China has begun using more and more coercive tactics to solve its disputes with Bhutan and to establish its diplomatic ties. This can be seen as China has continued to encroach Bhutan’s territories and foster connectivity in bordering and disputed regions. This was also the prime reason that contributed to the 2017 Doklam standoff between India and China. Further, China has laid claims to new Bhutanese territories for the first time. This was evident with its claims in the East – Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in 2020. Further, a report in 2021 also confirmed that China is practising salami-slicing strategies in Bhutan and is building military outposts and infrastructure in Bhutan’s sovereign and disputed territories. Thus, existentially challenging Bhutan’s sole existence. The challenges of which will only further grow with China’s increasing power and competition with India.
Thus, Bhutan’s survival strategy vis-à-vis a balance of threat alignment with India against China has created a deep dependence for Bhutan on Indian economy and aid. Bhutan can thus hardly imagine abiding or making concessions to the Chinese by upsetting India or its security concerns. It is hence this special relationship designed to ensure Bhutan’s survival that is now challenging the formers’ own territorial integrity and survival.
Survival and Happiness
Another important factor of Bhutan’s survival strategy is its Gross National Happiness (GNH) politics. With the beginning of its internationalization phase in the 70s, Bhutan embraced a distinct approach. Unlike the rest of the world that continues to embrace GDP, Bhutan has adopted GNH to assess its prosperity. This GNH is based on maintaining sustainability and promoting equitable social development, cultural preservation, environmental conversation, and good governance.
With initiative and ideas as such, Bhutan tried to legitimize Buddhist ideas and identity amongst the Bhutanese society – that was heterogeneous and increasingly polarised by the late 70s. This increasingly became the need: as India took over Sikkim and the ethnic and social differences against the Nepalis in Bhutan had intensified. Thus, this approach was considered to define the states’ national identity and governance and fostered a solid inclusive nation-building entity amongst the divided Bhutanese.
Although the GNH reduced Bhutan’s internal survival challenges, it has contributed to the reduction in economic and material growth of the state as well. Thus, impacting its military strength, border infrastructure, and material power. Therefore, even impacting its credibility to defend or guard borders against Chinese intrusions. In addition, a lack of home-grown economic growth has mandated Bhutan to depend on India and its special relationship. Thus, impacting Bhutan’s independence in its foreign policy formulation and making it more vulnerable to India’s interests and Chinese assertiveness, border claims and intrusions.
Thus, while Realists have long argued that small powers efficiently use their prevalent resources and integrate their economies with the other states and the international system, it is not the same case with Bhutan. The promotion and existence of GNH have limited its economic growth and integration with other states (except for India). Thus, making it more vulnerable to external interests and shocks, which challenge its survival and territorial sovereignty at the core.
The case of Bhutan thus indicates how small powers keen on ensuring their survival can put themselves at survival stake. Whilst, this article has only attempted to indicate a few of such instances much research has to be done on theoretic and pragmatic grounds. Especially, considering the fact that a states’ realpolitik and realist-oriented foreign policy conduct can be a two-edged sword – where they may help states to survive, but they may also put the same state at the risk of survival.
