23 July 2021, NIICE Commentary 7130
Niloufar Baghernia
Iran and China signed an agreement called ‘25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ on 27 March 2021, which has provoked diverse reactions both at the internal and external levels. On the one hand, some analysts argue that the agreement is not as significant as assumed, given that China will not prioritize Iran over other leading regional actors such as Saudi Arabia. They also take that China is the only alternative for Iran to survive at the regional and international levels; hence, Iran would prefer the West if it had the opportunity. On the other hand, some experts assume the deal a game-changer in the Middle East, strengthening Iran’s power and mitigating its isolation. This has even been highlighted after the victory of Ebrahim Raisi in the presidential election of Iran, believing that he will follow the Look East policy stronger than before.
Considering the deal, obviously, for Iran, it has numerous advantages which cannot be overlooked: having undergone many ups and downs in the relationship with China, now Iran may have a more solid partnership with China. A similar view to the international system and the equivalent interests could lead to trust and a higher level of trade in all sectors. Iran now can make sure that China will remain the top energy merchant in future cul-de-sacs and possible sanction impositions by the United States. In his piece on the China-Iran deal, Dr. Uzun also states that applying the national currency in oil trade and joint banking determines China’s ability to bypass sanctions identifying the deal’s potential to lighten Iran’s isolation. The deal will also help Tehran advance its influence in other regions. Behrouz Aghaei, the director-general of Ports and Maritime Department of Sistan-Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran, cites that as China has trade exchanges with more than 162 countries, Chinese shipping lines in Chabahar Port could link Iran to more than 45 ports and over 162 countries. Apart from this, the two countries recently signed an agreement concerning Asian cultural heritage protection. This is another aspect of promotion in relations between the two sides, given that it includes multiple elements such as “archaeology, sustainable development of cultural heritage sites, exchange for ideas, and prevention of cultural property trafficking.”
For China, Iran has constantly been a massive market for its products and a notable oil supplier. For some analysts, the deal is a step for China to find a more stable track in the Middle East. It will help China expand its footprints in the Persian Gulf, challenging the United States’ presence, weakening India’s position and its ties with the Middle Eastern countries, hence, developing its status in the Indian Ocean Region and ultimately securing its energy needs in the Middle East. Anthony H. Cordesman, in his piece, argues that one of the most important strategic interests for China is to ensure its access to Gulf petroleum and restrict Washington’s ability to influence this progress to China in a crisis or conflict. As China endeavors to balance India’s power in the Indian Ocean Region and reach its intentions, both Iran and Pakistan could significantly enhance Beijing’s presence in both the Middle East and the Indian Ocean Region. Pakistan has been considered an ally for the Chinese, whereas making an alliance with Iran has its own complications.
Iran differs from Pakistan for China to become an ally
China and Pakistan have repeatedly called their ties ‘all-weather allies’ and ‘firm as a rock.’ Michel Berkley of the Belfer Centre at Harvard University identifies China’s main interests in Pakistan; “maintaining Pakistan as a military rival to India; applying Pakistan as an overland trade and energy corridor; and thirdly, using Pakistan’s cooperation in severing links between Uighur separatists in Western China and Islamists in Pakistan.” Although some analysts take that Pakistan’s ties with China lack trust and the Chinese are cautious of all-weather allies with Islamabad, Pakistan plays a vital role in undermining India’s power in South Asia. India as China’s rival hampers Beijing’s influence in the Indian Ocean Region and, ultimately, turning into a hegemon in Asia. These have made some analysts cite that Pakistan plays a crucial role in China’s plans, such as a “new silk road connecting the energy fields of the Middle East and the markets of Europe to the mega-cities of East Asia.”
Although Iran has the potential to play the same role as Pakistan to shape alliances with China, some stumbling blocks hinder the process. China inspects Iran as a significant partner in the Middle East; however, other countries are equally or even more critical for China, such as Saudi Arabia. On 10 July 2018, at the eighth Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), which was held in Beijing, the sides adopted and signed three crucial “outcome documents, containing the Beijing Declaration, secondly, the Action Plan for 2018-2020, and the Declaration of Action on China-Arab States Belt and Road Cooperation.” Wang Yi, Chinese foreign minister, started his trip in Saudi Arabia, where he presented a “Five-Point Initiative to Achieving Security and Stability in the Middle East.” Some of the main points discussed at these meetings involve the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear program, proliferation concerns, maritime security, counterterrorism, economic development, vaccine cooperation, and post-conflict reconstruction.”
On 24 March 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi interviewed Al Arabiya in Riyadh. He was asked to explain about Chinese current Middle East policy. In this conversation, he claims that China aims to “advocate mutual respect, uphold equity and justice, achieve non-proliferation, jointly foster collective security, accelerate development cooperation” by his initiative, as mentioned earlier. Wang’s tour also confirmed how China balances its regional relationships as it attempts to reach its interests. For instance, he visited both Iran and Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding their hostility toward each other.
Mohsen Shariatinia, who is an assistant professor of Regional Studies at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, differentiates China and Iran’s principles. He argues that Iran and China do not pursue making alliances, in essence. The Islamic Republic of Iran is rooted in an anti-alliance model of revolution. Nonetheless, both Iran and China follow multilateral foreign policy without creating alliances. Another worth mentioning impediment in Sino-Iranian relations is the United States’ role. China, like other countries in the international system, seeks its more enormous interests in various regions. As many experts also confirm this, Beijing has surrendered its ties with Iran with the aim of more critical goals several times. They both are indeed opposed to the current international system and Washington’s influential power, but the history of their ties proves a diverse explanation. This also applies to president- elect Ebrahim Raisi whose strategy will be mostly the alleviation of poverty and boosting the economy as well as supporting the Muslim world.
In short, according to what was mentioned above, Pakistan and China are different but key players in the eyes of China. India is the primary factor in Beijing’s support of Islamabad. India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region and its strong ties with the United States threaten China’s security interests. Yet, despite the fact that China has political interests in the Middle East and seeks to gain political prestige by encouraging rivals to resolve their conflicts, the primary purpose of China in the region could be the advancement of its economic plans and energy security. Consequently, the agreement indeed has a high potential to boost Sino-Iranian ties, but due to the fact that China and Iran’s relations are chiefly touched with energy demands and projects such as BRI, and the new president’s priority as the economic recovery, it is unlikely to expect the deal to make Iran and China become allies in the Raisi administration.
