14 April 2020, NIICE Commentary 4085
Aneedrisha Hazarika
On April 6, the Chinese Ambassador to India tweeted rather empathetically, declaring the arrival of 50,000 masks in Gujarat. They had come as donations, all the way from Gujarat’s sister state in China, the province of Guangdong. However, this was not a unique gesture extended exclusively towards India. Instead, it was in continuation of China’s proactive humanitarian aid diplomacy and the deft use of evoking the sister-state and sister-city relations with its foreign counterparts. In these unusual times when the entire world is battling the pandemic of COVID-19, and when business-as-usual cannot be carried out, it can be observed that China is using the paradiplomatic route quite innovatively, in pursuit of its COVID diplomacy.
Understanding Paradiplomacy
Paradiplomacy (alternatively termed as parallel diplomacy, constituent diplomacy, multi layered diplomacy, micro diplomacy albeit with minute variations with regards to the aim of the engagements), is the phenomenon of external engagements by state/ provincial/ subnational governments. The term was initially invoked to qualify the conduct of foreign policy in the context of the semi-independent provinces of Quebec and British Columbia in Canada. Later, with the advent of globalisation and growing interconnectedness, it was crystallised as a norm of engagement for the subnational governments with the primary rationale of attracting offshore economic capital, apart from strengthening cultural ties and people to people contact .
Chinese Paradiplomacy in India
During the late 1970s, China underwent a series of economic reforms under the leadership of the then Premier Deng Xiaoping. Taking a departure from the state-centric approach to diplomacy, the coastal provinces were encouraged to actively scour for foreign investments and attract businesses with tax sops and other specific liberal economic policies. The next phase saw the process extent towards non-coastal provinces and, more particularly, to the cities.
Both India and China, have established sister-states and sister-cities network, which has become more extensive in recent years. At present, there are three pairs of sister-states and eleven pairs of sister-cities. Gurjat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are sister states of Guangdong, Sichuan and Fujian of China, respectively. In 2013, India and China signed an Agreement with the view of enhancing cooperation and linkages between their respective cities. Eventually, three metropolitan cities of India, viz. Delhi, Bengaluru, Kolkata were paired with three Chinese cities of Beijing, Chengdu, and Kunming, respectively. In 2015, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden visit to Beijing, Chennai-Chongqing, Hyderabad-Qingdao, and Aurangabad-Dunhuang entered into sister-cities relations while Karnataka-Sichuan established their sister-state connect. Subsequently, during the second India-China Informal Summit last year, it was decided to partner Tamil Nadu and Fujian as sister-states.
Even though at various intervals, these paradiplomatic endeavours were endorsed as measures promoting people to people contact and envisaged as potential streams for mutual engagements in culture, ideas and research, nothing much seem to have materialised on that front, apart from a few exceptions. For instance, the Joint Study of Buddhist caves and Chinese Buddhist Art by Dunhuang Academy and Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts. However, if one looks closely at these ‘sister-ships’, it can be argued that they have mirrored the existing or potential zones of Chinese investments in India. Economic paradiplomacy, with the motive of promoting trade and investment seems to have been high on the agenda behind forging these partnerships, as has been the case with Gujarat and Guangdong becoming sister-states in 2014. In the recently conducted China-India-Gujarat Economic and Trade Cooperation Conference in Ahmedabad, leaders from both these states/ province echoed their mutual admiration of being amongst the most developed states of their respective countries and stressed on the potential of deepening trade and investment linkages. Interestingly, China’s donations of masks also arrived in Gujarat.
Conclusion
Needless to say, China has structured a successful paradiplomatic model, involving both its provinces and cities alike. For instance, Beijing alone has entered into sister-cities agreement with 55 other cities/ states. In most of them, propelling deeper economic relations have been the forestay. However, repeated evocation of this quintessentially economic model of engagement during this pandemic cannot be brushed under the carpet. Understandably, China is in a desperate need of a facelift, post the considerable erosion of public opinion due to the debacle of the virus spreading out of Wuhan. To this end, Chinese government spokesperson, media houses, newspapers alike are strategically using this relationship to highlight the humanitarian side of the country. In another instance, the mention of the sister-state of Guangdong and Massachusetts is simply stressed, although the donations of masks were originating from the city of Shenzhen. Although this is not to discount the largess of the Chinese authorities and their philanthropic acts, but the continuous reference to the paradiplomatic structures that were until now primarily driven by economic motives, needs to be read with caution. Most definitely, this is in tandem with the COVID-19 diplomacy that China has embarked on, in full-throttle.
