26 December 2025, NIICE Commentary 12201
Lipun Kumar Sanbad
The global nuclear weapons control system that was once celebrated as the focal point of world strategic security is experiencing deep and concurrent forces that are driving it by 2026. The convergence of expirations of treaties, changes in geopolitical balances of power, the erosion of institutional protection, and the development of new technologies in achieving strategies has revealed profound fault lines in long-established arms control strategies. The erosion of nuclear restraining mechanisms may reach its watershed stage in the first half of 2026, and there is more than diplomatic posturing at stake; it may impact the very ongoing fabric of international security.
Expirations and Backsliding of Treaties
At the middle of the story of growing tension is the looming expiration of New START, the final bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. New START, which will expire on 5 February 2026, has traditionally restricted deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems and offers strong verification, inspection, and notification provisions. Its lapse is likely to undermine crucial openness between the two biggest nuclear armories in the world, and stand the likelihood of unchecked modernisation and distrust that breed competition and deployments. The future of the renewal or replacement negotiations has been said to be bleak by experts due to larger geopolitical tensions and the absence of momentum in the diplomatic process.
Parallel to this, the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the foundational multilateral treaty of non-proliferation and disarmament, is anticipated to take place in April 2026. RevCons, which are conducted every four to five years, are supposed to strengthen the commitment of the members as well as come up with a consensus action document. Nevertheless, even the 191 signatories of the NPT have not succeeded in coming up with final outcome documents during the last two meetings, and analysts predict that they will do so once again in 2026. In case such a trend continues, the normative authority of the NPT and the ability of the organization to hold divergent state interests would further diminish, which would erode confidence in the non-proliferation regime on a global level. These trends are indicative of a larger trend: institutional backsliding in arms control. Even the previously robust system of bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as SALT, INF, and CFE have already worn out during the last decade, leaving only the skeletons which are more and more hard to fit into a more complicated strategic environment.
Nuclear Multipolarism and Geopolitical Change
Traditionally, the U.S.-Russia strategic dyad served as the foundation of nuclear arms control architecture, which enabled the attainment of symmetry in incentives and structural stability in the institutions during the Cold War period and the immediate aftermath thereof. This bilateral model is, however, complicated by the current geopolitical situation. The increasing nuclear potential in China, as well as its unwillingness to negotiate trilateral arms control, upsets the balance of power, on which most of the traditional agreements were based. The continuous progress in the rapid development of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces and silo infrastructure in China is an indicator of a transition to a more multipolar nuclear order, where a new pattern of deterrence relationships is developing. This change is also enhanced by the changing strategic alliances and associations. Tighter collaboration between Russia and China in military and diplomatic arenas, albeit not as far as actual alliance frameworks, is possible may put strains on the U.S. and NATO to reevaluate deterrence postures. This geopolitical realignment, in its turn, makes the efforts to create the multilateral treaties that are balanced rather difficult due to the presence of a high level of asymmetry between states in terms of threat perceptions and strategic priorities.
Dilution of Verifying and Compliance Mechanism
In addition to expirations of treaties, the other issue of great concern is the undermining of verification and compliance mechanisms, on which arms control agreement is based. As the inspection and notification processes of New START were not working anymore, the transparency that formerly reduced the risk of misperception between the nuclear powers is almost lost. In the absence of these confidence-building steps, the fog of strategic uncertainty might grow, and as a result, unintentional escalation is more probable in the case of a crisis. Making these matters worse, there are reports on nuclear-related technologies and tests that constantly put pressure on trust. An example is the fact that the testing of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile in Russia, together with the claims on the part of the U.S. leadership that the norm of non-testing could be restored, has led to a degree of normative elimination of the non-testing norm that has been dominant since the end of the twentieth century.
New Strategic Complexities and Emerging Technologies
Nuclear arms control not only exists in the landscape of geopolitics and treaties, but also the landscape is now influenced by emerging technologies that erode the established division of nuclear and conventional forces. Non-missile defense networks, state-of-the-art missiles, and hypersonic missiles add uncertainty to strategic decision-making. These inventions change the equilibrium of deterrence, which can destabilize the crisis stability in cases where it is seen to compromise the second strike capabilities or heighten first strike incentives. Also, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems has started to apply to nuclear command, control, and decision support systems, creating new verification issues that were not contemplated by the current treaties. The fact that AI can increase the speed of making decisions and make attribution harder would riskily increase risks in high-tension situations, requiring new risk mitigation and collaborative surveillance frameworks.
Nuclear Taboo and Normative Erosion
Along with structural and technological pressure is the normative aspect of nuclear arms control. For decades, the existence of a strong nuclear taboo, or the ethical dislike of the use of nuclear weapons, has influenced the actions of states. However, the cracks in this taboo can be observed in the public discourse and in strategic rhetoric more and more. Attitudes by the population in particular situations of a sense of increased insecurity and a sense of existential threat can undermine a normative opposition against nuclear warfighting ideas, or reduce the deployment threshold in crisis situations. It is important to incorporate both the cognitive and affective aspects in strategic evaluations in order to determine the interaction between the public sentiment, media framing, and political rhetoric to reconstruct the nuclear norms, a field that requires additional empirical research.
Conclusion
Multiple expirations of treaties, institutional undermining, multipolar nuclear relations, and new technological developments present a grim outlook for global nuclear arms control by 2026. In the absence of bold diplomatic involvement, the globe may further move to a more dangerous period of tactical rivalry, with suspicion taking the place of openness and tales of nationhood safety put over unilateral benefit over national restraint. However, some avenues would alleviate these stresses. To define the new norms and verification measures that must capture the multipolar realities, first, new diplomatic structures involving the emerging nuclear power, especially China, are necessary. Second, new technologies, with their verification issues of AI, hypersonic delivery, and integrated defense networks, should be included in the modernized arms control treaties. Third, the renewal of civil society and professional discussions, including multinational forums and track two initiatives, may strengthen normative restraint pressure and promote informed policy deliberation. Finally, nuclear arms control will need a holistic approach that will close the gaps between the technical, institutional, and normative spheres of international security. The other, slow movement into uncontrolled competitions and strategic turmoil would take years of effort to reduce the danger of a nuclear disaster.
Lipun Kumar Sanbad is a Research Intern at NIICE and completed his MA in Politics and International Studies from Pondicherry University, India.
