Watch it on the NIICE Nepal YouTube channel

EVENT REPORT

The Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE) hosted a webinar on the state of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, headed by the speaker, Dr. Scott L. Kastner, an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park. Kastner discusses his work, ‘War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait,’ and reaffirms the possibility of the Taiwan Strait as one of the most significant conflict points in East Asia, particularly after the heightened tensions in the region post-US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, supported by US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken’s suggestion that PRC China maintains an urgency in its goal of reunification of China and Taiwan.

Unlike Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jiou, who maintained cordial relations with China’s Xi Jinping, leading to a state of detente and bi-lateral dialogues on the economic front, the newly elected Tsai Ing-Wen has not been as accommodative of the PRC agenda on core sovereignty issues as much as her predecessor. This has led to China adopting a range of coercive measures, including diplomatic pressures to alienate Taiwan in international forums, economic pressures, and, most importantly, military pressure by circling the island through military aircrafts. Nonetheless, Kastner notes various scholars' differing perspectives and conclusions to suitably assess the possibility of an armed conflict between China and Taiwan, especially in recognition of the complex and often contrasting trends in relations between the two countries.

Kastner utilises graphs to showcase the shifting balance of power in the region, demonstrating the decreased Taiwanese spending on military arsenal versus the rapid expansion of the military budget in China, which creates a glaring possibility that the Chinese might resort to military aggression to achieve its goal of national unification. On the other hand, in the last twenty years or so, China has replaced the USA as the largest trading partner of Taiwan, leading to economic integration and higher costs in case of conflict, but due to decreasing economic integration over the last decade, it raises questions on how long economic integration can act as a barrier to armed conflict.

Citizen surveys in Taiwan paint a political and social picture of the conflict, and most respondents in the last 15 years or so have identified as solely Taiwanese rather than Chinese Taiwanese or just Chinese. However, they have adopted a much more pragmatic outlook on questions of unification, with options like ‘maintaining the status quo indefinitely’ garnering the highest votes. Therefore, a shift towards a Taiwanese-focused identity does not come at the cost of an armed conflict with China.

Kastner discusses his approach towards the possibility of such conflicts, building a model based on both Taiwanese and Chinese mix of revisionism and status quo, where one side wants to avoid curtailment of sovereignty and more significant international space. At the same time, the other seeks to cut down on the formalisation of independence and move towards unification. He utilises bargaining literature in IR to place Chinese and Taiwanese ideal outcomes at the opposing ends of the continuum, while the current Taiwanese status quo lies somewhere in between. War would have catastrophic effects for both countries, generating red lines for each, which would mutually coerce them into accepting a middle ground between their reality and their aspirations. Furthermore, the possibility of war can result from Taiwan’s quest for an international profile and attempts to decenter China in Taiwanese social and political life. The redline conflict scenario arises when Taiwan continues to push its boundaries with China, and China finds its more beneficial to undertake war rather than exercise restraint. However, Taiwan’s costs of conflict are worse than China's, primarily due to China’s usage of costly signals to constrain Taiwan, whose call for greater sovereignty would be symbolic rather than tangible. Nonetheless, despite Beijing’s apprehensions over changing public opinion in Taiwan and deepening US-Taiwan defence relations, it has more to gain through patience due to the possibility of its military aggression backfiring. Moreover, Taiwan would resist accepting bargaining terms that cut down on their existing independence and would be drawn to more risk-taking behaviour.

During the question round, Kastner shared his thoughts on the importance of Taiwan maintaining deterrence and reassuring China that its security relations with the US are simply defensive and not offensive. He shuts down the possibility of Taiwan going nuclear, as Chinese retaliation would be given in that scenario, and mulls over the QUAD’s role as an extended source of deterrence. On the other hand, he notes the lack of the EU’s commitment to the China-Taiwan question, while the USA has shown explicit security support to Taiwan over the years. However, the official USA position in case of actual conflict remains strategically vague, although Kastner remains wary of equating it to the USA’s inaction in case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. He wraps it up with his perspective on whether there would be a conflict in the near future, reinstating that while Taiwan remains a priority for Xi Jinping, it is not the top priority.

Prepared by Shreya Das, NIICE Intern